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INTRODUCTION 
Anyone who has ever worked in a retail setting cringes when the 
owner puts the Assistant Manager in charge of the store. The Assistant 
Manager is the subordinate to whom the owner gives vague instructions, 
and then fails to grant sufficient decision-making authority to carry out 
those instructions. The Assistant Manager’s insecurity quickly shows; 
this person is fairly sure of the mandate but not necessarily certain how 
to go about achieving it. This person, though well meaning, is essentially 
powerless and ineffective. Anyone who must depend on this person in 
any meaningful way is in for an uphill struggle for satisfaction. 
Congress, acting as the “owner” of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 
has put the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Army 
Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) in charge of the store. In the 1970s, 
Congress supplemented the Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”) with 
comprehensive environmental legislation, but delegated to the EPA a 
scientifically impossible task.1 Congress proclaimed a sweeping mandate 
to protect the integrity of the nation’s waterways from the ever-growing 
national water pollution problem, and then empowered the EPA to act 
only within the actual geographical limits of those waterways.2 The EPA 
has struggled since then to execute Congress’s broad mandate in the 
wake of mixed political messages and jurisdictional restraints. 
Furthermore, the EPA, at once encouraged and hobbled, has inevitably 
stumbled into the many pitfalls of state sovereignty, constitutional 
problems, and constraints arising from the Administrative Procedure 
Act.3 Indeed, regulated individuals who rely on the EPA to administer 
the CWA consistently are currently forced to follow a moving target. 
This comment explores the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
administration of the Clean Water Act, detailing its partnership with the 
Army Corps of Engineers and its struggle to recognize and enforce the 
grey areas of Congress’s intent.4 It also explores the tension flowing 
from the long struggle of the EPA to define the contours of Clean Water 
Act jurisdiction in the shadow of their statutory limitations and 
                                                                                                             
 1 The Clean Water Act, enacted in 1972 and codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-63, 1265, 
1281-92, 1311-26, 1328, 1341-45, 1361-76, took over the pollution control aspects of the 
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 
403-04, 406-409, 411-416, 418, 502, 687, but retained its geographical jurisdictional 
limitations. 
 2 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (“The objective of this chapter is to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”), 33 
U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006) (“The Secretary may issue permits . . . for the discharge of 
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters . . . .”). 
 3 See infra Parts II.A-C. 
 4 See discussion infra Part I. 
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conflicting political messages from Congress, and the struggle of the 
federal courts to do the same with no clear guidance from the Supreme 
Court.5 Finally, this comment focuses on the Clean Water Act’s 
misplaced geographical link to navigable water servitude and suggests an 
alternate basis for federal water pollution jurisdiction.6 This comment 
proposes that the CWA’s geographical jurisdictional link to navigable 
waters is unnecessary under the Commerce Clause and unfaithful to the 
stated objective of the Act. Furthermore, this comment recommends that 
Congress strengthen the CWA by dispensing with the unnecessary 
geographical jurisdictional link and allowing the EPA to regulate 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce regardless of 
where those activities occur. 
Part I provides a legislative history of the Clean Water Act, 
beginning with the origins of federal navigation servitude and the River 
and Harbors Act of 1899. The RHA was an early attempt by Congress to 
regulate the nation’s rivers and harbors and later to protect their integrity 
generally from the effects of pollution, and later formed the basis for the 
CWA.7 Part I then traces the legislative history through to the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, pointing out the moment when 
Congress could have made federal water pollution control effective and 
long-lasting. Part I then moves on through the Corps’ regulatory 
language under the CWA, a federal court’s order to amend the language, 
and then to the congressional struggle to amend the Clean Water Act 
itself in 1977. Nine years later, the EPA and the Corps finally reconciled 
conflicting regulatory language defining their jurisdiction under the 
CWA.8 Remarkably, Congress never took the logical step needed to 
resolve confusion over the CWA’s jurisdiction, namely, to remove the 
CWA’s geographical limitation and allow the EPA to regulate based on 
their scientific expertise.9 
Part II examines the Supreme Court’s efforts over time to define 
CWA jurisdiction, the Corps’ regulatory responses to those decisions, 
and the resulting confusion in the federal courts. The most recent 
Supreme Court decision to address the issue of CWA jurisdiction, United 
States v. Rapanos,10 has done little if anything to dispel confusion in the 
federal courts or with the administrators of the CWA. Indeed, the 4-1-4 
split decision has created additional confusion in the lower courts as they 
                                                                                                             
 5 See discussion infra Part II. 
 6 See discussion infra Part III. 
 7 See discussion infra Part II. 
 8 See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 9 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 
 10 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). 
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struggle to fathom its meaning.11 Part II illustrates the abject 
ineffectiveness of attempts to normalize CWA jurisdiction judicially or 
through Corps regulation, which points strongly to Congressional 
amendment of the CWA as the only remaining and meaningful solution. 
Part III offers alternate and possibly equally valid ways to discern 
the ultimate holding of the Rapanos 4-1-4 split decision. This Part 
examines whether Marks v. United States12 might provide assistance and 
details how interpretations of the Rapanos decision in the lower courts 
have already diverged.13 This Part also outlines three approaches to 
handling the jurisdiction issue going forward, namely continuing on a 
case-by-case basis, promulgating new agency regulations, and amending 
the CWA itself. The first two approaches have already proven ineffective 
and troublesome.14 The third approach has the potential to solve the 
jurisdictional issue and significantly strengthen the legislation.15 
Finally, this Part offers a solution to the judicial and agency 
confusion caused by the CWA’s “navigable waters” jurisdictional limit. 
This Part suggests that Congress could do away with the limit entirely 
and the CWA would still pass constitutional muster, as does the 
Endangered Species Act, for example, which contains no such 
jurisdictional limit.16 Congress could instead root its authority solely in 
its power to regulate interstate commerce, without any geographical 
jurisdictional limit to “waters of the United States.”17 In this way, 
Congress could settle the jurisdiction question, remain faithful to the 
stated purpose of the Clean Water Act, and create truly effective federal 
water pollution control legislation. 
I. FEDERAL CLEAN WATER LEGISLATION 
Congress does not possess unlimited power to act under the United 
States Constitution. The Constitution instead delegates to Congress “All 
legislative Powers herein granted.”18 That is, the Constitution sets forth 
limited and enumerated Congressional powers. Among these is the 
power to declare war, to collect taxes, and to “regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
                                                                                                             
 11 See discussion infra Part II.F. 
 12 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 13 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 14 See discussion infra Part III.B.1-2. 
 15 See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
 16 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 17 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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Tribes.”19 It is under the last authority that Congress has enacted all 
federal pollution control legislation. 
A. Federal Navigation Servitude: Early Supreme Court Decisions 
In an early decision, the Supreme Court held that Congressional 
Commerce Clause power includes the authority to control the navigable 
waters of the United States.20 The Gibbons Court stated that “[a]ll 
America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 
‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must 
have been so understood, when the constitution was framed.”21 
Therefore, the Gibbons Court concluded, Congress had power to control 
channels of interstate commerce such as “bays, inlets, rivers, harbours, 
and ports” of the United States.22 
In another important early decision, the Supreme Court held that 
the term “navigable” in the United States was not linked to tides as it is 
in other countries. The Daniel Ball Court noted in 1871 that “[h]ere the 
ebb and flow of the tide do not constitute the usual test, as in England, or 
any test at all of the navigability of waters.”23 The Daniel Ball Court 
noted that in the United States, many waters are commercially navigable 
in fact but that are not tidal.24 The Daniel Ball Court held that “navigable 
waters” therefore included non-tidal waters “used, or are susceptible of 
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce.”25 
The Daniel Ball Court further held that such waters are subject to 
Congressional control “when they form . . . by themselves, or by uniting 
with other waters, a containued [sic] highway over which commerce is or 
may be carried on with other States or foreign countries.”26 This decision 
affirmed Congress’s power to regulate bodies of water such as the Great 
Lakes and intrastate rivers as instruments of commerce. 
                                                                                                             
 19 Id. § 8, cl. 3. 
 20 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) (“The power of Congress . . . 
comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that 
navigation may be, in any manner, connected with ‘commerce with foreign nations, or 
among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.’”). 
 21 Id. at 190. 
 22 Id. at 208. 
 23 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871). 
 24 Id. (“Some of our rivers are as navigable for many hundreds of miles above as they 
are below the limits of tide water, and some of them are navigable for great distances by 
large vessels, which are not even affected by the tide at any point during their entire 
length.”); see also Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457 (1852) (“It is evident that 
a definition that would at this day limit public rivers in this country to tide-water rivers is 
utterly inadmissible. We have thousands of miles of public navigable water, including 
lakes and rivers where there is no tide.”). 
 25 Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563. 
 26 Id. 
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In a later opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed and expanded the 
Daniel Ball Court’s definition of “navigable waters” as it applied to 
federal regulatory jurisdiction.27 The Appalachian Electric Court held 
that waters that are now or ever have been susceptible for use in 
transporting goods, either in their natural state or with reasonable 
improvements, are “navigable waters” of the United States.28 The 
Appalachian Electric Court thus expanded Congress’s regulatory power 
over waters that were, either in their natural state or with reasonable 
improvements, susceptible to navigation or had been susceptible to 
navigation in the past. 
B. Pre-Clean Water Act Jurisdiction: The River and Harbors Act 
Building on the Gibbons and Daniel Ball decisions, Congress 
enacted the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (“RHA”).29 
The RHA gave the United States Army Corps of Engineers authority to 
protect, enhance, and develop navigable waters.30 It also gave the 
Secretary of the Army regulatory authority, through the Corps, to grant 
or deny permission to “excavate or fill or in any manner to alter or 
modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of . . . any navigable 
water of the United States.”31 Finally, the RHA gave the Secretary of the 
Army authority to grant or deny, through the Corps, permission “to 
throw, discharge, or deposit . . . any refuse matter of any kind . . . into 
any navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary” where 
“the same shall . . . be washed into such navigable water.”32 The RHA 
provided similar regulation of dumping from the shore to prevent 
navigation from being “impeded or obstructed.”33 This provision also 
contained an exception for “the improvement of navigable waters or 
construction of public works.”34 Thus, the main concern of the RHA was 
the protection of the physical navigability of the nation’s waterways. 
For nearly seventy years, the Corps generally exercised its 
regulatory authority to protect navigable waters that were actually being 
                                                                                                             
 27 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 
 28 Id. at 407-08 (“A waterway, otherwise suitable for navigation, is not barred from 
that classification merely because artificial aids must make the highway suitable for use 
before commercial navigation may be undertaken. . . . When once found to be navigable, 
a waterway remains so.”). 
 29 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403-04, 406-09, 411-16, 418, 502, 687 (2006)). 
 30 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407 (2006). 
 31 33 U.S.C. § 403. 
 32 33 U.S.C. § 407. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
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used as channels to facilitate commerce.35 Environmental problems were 
ordinarily left to the states to control.36 However, “the states [generally] 
failed to enact or implement effective laws to control or prevent water 
pollution.” 37 By the late 1960s, the Corps recognized that “water 
pollution and wholesale destruction of aquatic habitat, fisheries, and 
wetland areas that lie within the reach of the traditional navigable waters 
of the United States” were becoming increasingly serious problems.38 
In 1968, the Corps responded to the problem of water pollution by 
promulgating a new set of regulations.39  Rather than limiting their scope 
solely to the protection of the physical navigability of the nation’s 
waterways, the regulations adopted general policies and specific 
procedures for the Corps to consider matters of public interest “in 
processing permit applications for dredging, filling, excavation, and 
other related work in navigable waters of the United States.”40 Relevant 
factors included “the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish and 
wildlife, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and the general 
public interest.”41 The regulations also provided for mandatory public 
notice to “all parties deemed likely to be interested” of permit 
applications for any work aside from “dredging of vessel berths and 
approach channels which cannot affect adversely any interests.”42 The 
District Engineer or other officer would preside over discretionary public 
hearings for permit applications “whenever there appear[ed] to be 
sufficient public interest.”43 
The Corps construed its jurisdiction under the RHA so broadly 
during this time that legislative action seemed virtually inevitable.44 
Congress could have either expressly affirmed or curtailed the Corps’ 
jurisdiction simply by amending the language of the RHA. To its credit, 
what Congress did instead was pen an entirely different type of 
legislation with an entirely different focus in another area of the United 
States Code.45 
                                                                                                             
 35 Tyler Moore, Defining “Waters of the United States”: Canals, Ditches, and 
Drains, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 39 (2004). 
 36 Donna M. Downing et al., Navigating Through Clean Water Act Jurisdiction: A 
Legal Review, 23 WETLANDS 475, 477 (2003). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Administrative Procedure, 33 Fed. Reg. 18,670  (Dec. 18, 1968). 
 40 Id. at 18,672. 
 41 Id. at 18,671. 
 42 Id. at 18,673. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
 45 The RHA focuses on regulating obstructions to navigation, alterations of channels, 
and depositing refuse into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407 (2006). The 
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C. Jurisdiction under the CWA: The Crooked Stream 
Both the Corps’ expanding interpretation of its jurisdiction under 
the RHA and the RHA’s failure to fully address the growing problems of 
water pollution could not continue indefinitely. Congress responded to 
the widening gap in federal legislation by enacting the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly referred to as the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”).46 The CWA comprised a comprehensive 
legislative anti-pollution scheme and also set the stage for the difficulties 
to come, including a misplaced anchor in federal navigation servitude 
and bifurcation of administrative duties between the EPA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers.47 
In enacting the CWA, Congress retained the “navigable waters” 
language of the RHA to indicate the Corps’ jurisdiction under the new 
legislation.48 Congress made it clear that it intended the term “navigable 
waters” to embody the “broadest possible constitutional interpretation.”49 
The Committee on Public Works’ report to the House demonstrated this 
intention: 
One term that the Committee was reluctant to define was the 
term “navigable waters.” The reluctance was based on the fear 
that any interpretation would be read narrowly. However, this is 
not the Committee’s intent. The Committee fully intends that the 
term “navigable waters” be given the broadest possible 
constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency 
                                                                                                             
RHA is located in Title 33, Chapter 9 of the U.S. Code, which addresses the “protection 
of navigable waters and of harbor and river improvements generally.”  The CWA, by 
contrast, was intended to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). The CWA is located in 
Title 33, Chapter 26 of the U.S. Code, which addresses “water pollution prevention and 
control research and related programs.” 
 46 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 
(1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-63, 1265, 1281-92, 1311-26, 1328, 
1341-45, 1361-76 (2006)). Congress passed the bill overwhelmingly.  While the House of 
Representatives passed the bill by a margin of 366 to 11, the Senate passed the bill 
unanimously. See 118 CONG. REC. 36,774 (Oct. 17, 1972), 118 CONG. REC. 37,055 (Oct. 
18, 1972). President Nixon vetoed. Message of President Nixon on Vetoing S. 2770, 8 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 43 (Oct. 17, 1972). However, Congress overrode it the 
following day. Id.; see 118 CONG. REC. 36,879 (Oct. 17, 1972), 118 CONG. REC. 37,060 
(Oct. 18, 1972). 
 47 See infra notes 48, 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 48 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006) (“The Secretary may issue permits . . . for the 
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters . . . .”) 
 49 H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131 (1972); see H.R. REP. NO. 92-1465, at 144 (1972) 
(Conf. Rep.). 
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determinations which have been made or may be made for 
administrative purposes.50 
A Senate-House Conference Committee Report echoed this language and 
affirmed Congress’s intent.51 In the end, Congress used broad and vague 
language in Section 502 of the CWA by defining the term “navigable 
waters” to mean “the waters of the United States, including the territorial 
seas.”52 
The CWA’s creation of a dual source of jurisdictional interpretation 
would muddy the waters for years to come. In section 101 of the CWA, 
Congress provided that the “Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency . . . shall administer” the CWA.53 This delegation not 
only gave the Administrator of the EPA considerable discretion in 
interpreting the CWA, but also set the framework for future 
misinterpretations of the CWA by both the EPA and the Corps, which 
would administer the permit programs under the CWA with supervision 
by the EPA. 
Section 404 of the CWA granted the Secretary of the Army, 
through the Chief of Engineers, authority to regulate “discharge of 
dredged or fill material into navigable waters” at particular disposal 
sites.54 The Secretary of the Army was to specify a disposal site for each 
permit “through the application of guidelines developed by the [EPA] 
Administrator, in conjunction with the Secretary.” 55 The CWA provided 
that the EPA Administrator’s and the Secretary’s guidelines must be 
“based upon criteria comparable to the criteria applicable to the territorial 
seas, the contiguous zone, and the ocean under [section 403 of the 
CWA].”56 The guidelines under section 403 of the CWA include: 
(A) the effect of disposal of pollutants on human health or 
welfare, including but not limited to plankton, fish, shellfish, 
wildlife, shorelines, and beaches; 
(B) the effect of disposal of pollutants on marine life including 
the transfer, concentration, and dispersal of pollutants or their 
byproducts through biological, physical, and chemical processes; 
changes in marine ecosystem diversity, productivity, and 
stability; and species and community population changes; 
                                                                                                             
 50 H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131. 
 51 H.R. REP. NO. 92-1465, at 144. 
 52 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006). 
 53 Clean Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2006). 
 54 Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). 
 55 Clean Water Act § 404(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2006). 
 56 Id. 
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(C) the effect of disposal, of pollutants on esthetic, recreation, 
and economic values; 
(D) the persistence and permanence of the effects of disposal of 
pollutants; 
(E) the effect of the disposal at varying rates, of particular 
volumes and concentrations of pollutants; 
(F) other possible locations and methods of disposal or recycling 
of pollutants including land-based alternatives; and 
(G) the effect on alternate uses of the oceans, such as mineral 
exploitation and scientific study.57 
Thus, whereas the RHA had previously limited the Corps objectives to 
solely protect the physical navigability of the nation’s waterways, the 
CWA expanded the Corps’ focus to address critical issues of pollution of 
the nation’s waterways. 
In keeping with its own mandate within the CWA to read 
“navigable waters” as broadly as possible, the Corps promulgated a rule 
establishing the outer limits of its jurisdiction in 1974.58 The Corps 
defined “navigable waters of the United States” and “navigable waters” 
as “those waters of the United States which are subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or may be 
in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign 
commerce.”59 This expansive reading seems to reflect the Corps’ 
responsiveness to the growing problem of pollution in the United States 
in the 1970s and to Congress’s intent that “navigable waters” be given 
the broadest possible reading allowed under the Constitution. 
Far from curtailing the Corps’ ruling, one federal court has insisted 
that the Corps construe its jurisdiction even more broadly.60 In July of 
1975, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
ordered the Corps to rescind the portion of their 1974 rule “as limits the 
permit jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers by definition or otherwise 
to other than ‘the waters of the United States’” and to “[p]ublish within 
forty (40) days . . . proposed regulations clearly recognizing the full 
regulatory mandate of the [CWA].”61 The district court thus ordered the 
                                                                                                             
 57 Clean Water Act § 403, 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c)(1) (2006). 
 58 Administrative Procedure, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115 (April 3, 1974). 
 59 Id. at 12,119. 
 60 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). 
 61 Id. at 686 (emphasis added). 
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Corps to extend its jurisdiction “to the maximum extent possible under 
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”62 
In response, the Corps issued interim final regulations that included 
a redefinition of “navigable waters” for purposes of section 404 of the 
CWA.63 The new “navigable waters” encompassed all coastal waters 
shoreward to their mean high water mark and all coastal wetlands 
capable of supporting vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions.64 
Inland “navigable waters” included all navigable rivers, lakes, and 
streams and their tributaries (primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.), and all 
interstate waters.65 Jurisdiction extended to intrastate waters that have 
recreational, fishing, industrial or agricultural connection to interstate 
commerce and adjacent wetlands capable of supporting vegetation that 
requires saturated soil conditions.66 “Manmade canals . . . navigated by 
recreational or other craft” were also included.67 Drainage and irrigation 
ditches were excluded, but the new definition gave the District Engineer 
discretion to regulate “ecologically valuable water bodies [and] 
environmentally damaging practices” on a case-by-case basis.68 
The Corps thus gave effect to the district court’s order to expand 
“navigable waters” jurisdiction to the outer limits of the Commerce 
Clause, as Congress contemplated in crafting the Clean Water Act of 
1972.69 Shortly thereafter, the House of Representatives introduced a bill 
that sought to narrow the Corps’ jurisdiction.70 The proposed legislation 
generated considerable debate.71 
D. The Clean Water Act of 1977 and its Effect on Jurisdiction 
In 1977, following the Corps’ promulgation of interim final 
regulations in 1975 and broad assertion of jurisdiction thereafter, 
Congress considered interim amendments to the Clean Water Act.72 The 
House introduced House Bill 3199 and referred it to the Committee on 
Public Works and Transportation.73 The Committee noted in House 
                                                                                                             
 62 Id. 
 63 Administrative Procedure, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (July 25, 1975). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 31,321. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See supra notes 49-51, 64-69 and accompanying text. 
 70 See Clean Water Act of 1977, H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. (as introduced by Rep. 
Roberts and referred to the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., Feb. 17, 1977). 
 71 See 123 CONG. REC. 26,690 (1977). 
 72 Clean Water Act of 1977, H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. (as introduced by Rep. Roberts 
and referred to the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., Feb. 17, 1977). 
 73 Id. 
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Report 139 that this major piece of legislation must focus on achieving 
“interim improvements within the existing framework” of the Clean 
Water Act of 1972.74 The Committee noted that a “limited, selective list 
of relatively modest adjustments can and must be enacted immediately,” 
and that House Bill 3199 “contains those amendments of most pressing 
urgency.”75 
House Bill 3199 proposed a redefinition of “navigable waters” as 
they applied to section 404 to include only waters “presently used, or 
susceptible of use in their natural condition or by reasonable 
improvement” in interstate commerce.76 The bill limited Section 404 
jurisdiction to those waters and their adjacent wetlands, which it defined 
as wetlands periodically inundated by contiguous navigable waters and 
normally supporting vegetation that required saturated soil.77 Debate 
ended on the House floor with an adoption of the narrowed definition of 
“waters.”78 
The Senate bill contained no such redefinition.79 Instead, the Senate 
approached the problem of Corps overregulation by first limiting the 
activities over which the Corps would have jurisdiction and then 
delegating some responsibility for regulation to federally approved state 
programs.80 Debate on the Senate floor defeated an amendment 
proposing adoption of the House’s redefinition of “waters”; thus, the 
Corps’ expansive definition of “waters” remained unchanged.81 
Eventually, the House abandoned its efforts to narrow the definition 
of “waters.” The Senate’s approach prevailed in the final version of the 
Clean Water Act of 1977 signed into law by President Carter.82  In 
Senator Baker’s words, “the legislation as ultimately passed . . . 
‘retain[ed] the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation’s waters 
exercised in the 1972 [Clean Water Act].’”83 Regulation going forward 
would necessarily focus less on the navigability of the waters being 
regulated and more on the activity that endangered them. 
                                                                                                             
 74 H.R. REP. NO. 95-139, at 1-2 (1977). 
 75 Id. at 2. 
 76 Clean Water Act of 1977, H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. § 16(b) (as introduced by Rep. 
Roberts and referred to the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., Feb. 17, 1977). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Clean Water Act of 1977, H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. § 216 (as passed by the House of 
Representatives, Apr. 5, 1977). 
 79 S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 56, 65 (1977). 
 80 Id. at 65-72. 
 81 123 CONG. REC. 26,690 (1977). 
 82 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1281(a), 1294-97 (2006)). 
 83 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136 (1985) 
(quoting 123 CONG. REC. 39,209 (1977)) (first alteration in original). 
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E. State Permitting Provision under the Clean Water Act of 1977 
The Clean Water Act of 1977 represents the latest major revision to 
the Clean Water Act. Although the House, in considering this new 
legislation, was unable to form a consensus to narrow CWA jurisdiction, 
Congress reached at least one important compromise with the States. The 
Clean Water Act of 1977 included a provision for federally approved 
state permit programs to replace Corps regulation of fill material 
discharge under certain conditions.84 However, the provision did not 
allow States to supersede the Corps’ jurisdiction to regulate fill discharge 
into waters that were actually navigable or waters subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide, “including wetlands adjacent thereto.”85 
As discussed supra, the fact that states had declined to take a 
proactive stance in controlling pollution in the nation’s waterways 
spawned the original Clean Water Act of 1972.86 Indeed, granting states 
the power to administer permit programs under the Clean Water Act has 
not induced states to do so.87 As one EPA administrator would observe 
nearly twenty years after the Clean Water Act of 1977’s enactment, 
“States and Tribes may assume operation of the section 404 program, 
and to date two have done so (Michigan and New Jersey).”88 This 
statement is powerful evidence that ambivalence among the states to the 
water pollution problem persists and the Corps’ jurisdiction is the only 
thing that stands between the health of the nation’s waters and the 
ravages of water pollution. 
F. EPA and Corps Definitions Conflict 
In the same year Congress passed the Clean Water Act of 1977, the 
Corps finalized its 1975 interim rule and notably changed the term to be 
defined from “navigable waters” to the “waters of the United States” to 
more closely follow the CWA’s language.89 Two years later, the EPA 
revised its definition of “waters of the United States,” adding the phrase 
                                                                                                             
 84 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (2006). 
 85 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 138 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1)). 
 86 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
 87 See Interpreting the Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Recent Decision in the 
Joint Cases of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
on “The Waters of the United States”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, 
Wildlife, and Water of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub.Works, 109th Cong. 7 (2006) 
(statement of Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Administrator for Water, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency and John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Civil Works, Department of the Army). 
 88 Id. (emphasis added). 
 89 Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144 (July 
19, 1977). 
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“waters the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or 
could affect” interstate commerce.90 The EPA’s definition, therefore, was 
broader than the Corps’ definition. The two authorities were under a 
statutory mandate to cooperate, and regulated individuals would be 
significantly affected by any confusion between them. The discrepancy 
in the definitions, therefore, presented a potentially serious problem. 
To resolve the question, the Secretary of the Army sent a letter on 
March 29, 1979 to the Attorney General of the United States.91 The letter 
requested the Attorney General’s opinion on “whether the [Clean Water] 
Act gives ultimate administrative authority to determine the reach of the 
term ‘navigable water’ for purposes of [section] 404” to the Secretary of 
the Army or the EPA Administrator.92 Later that year, the U.S. Attorney 
General answered by issuing an opinion stating that “the structure and 
intent of the Act support an interpretation of [section] 404 that gives the 
[EPA] Administrator the final administrative responsibility” for 
construing the term.93 
Some years later, in 1986, the Corps issued final regulations 
consolidating six rulemaking events and revising its definition of “waters 
of the United States” to match that of the EPA.94 Later still in 1989, the 
two authorities entered a Memorandum of Agreement pursuant to the 
Attorney General’s 1979 letter and “set[ting] forth an appropriate 
allocation of responsibilities between the EPA and U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (Corps) to determine the geographic jurisdiction of the Section 
404 program.”95 This consolidation of definitions and clarification of 
responsibilities brings the discussion to the current state of the term 
“waters of the United States.” 
G. Present Definition of the “Waters of the United States” 
The language in the 1986 final regulations issued by the Army 
Corps of Engineers tracks precisely the regulations promulgated earlier 
                                                                                                             
 90 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; Revision of Regulations, 44 
Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,901 (June 7, 1979). 
 91 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197 (1979). 
 92 Id. at 1. 
 93 Id. at 11. 
 94 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 
41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
 95 Memorandum of Agreement between the Army Corps of Eng’rs and the Envtl. 
Prot. Agency (Jan. 19, 1989), http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/guidance/404f.html; 
see Wetlands Regulation and the SWANCC Decision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Env’t and Pub.Works, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of G. Tracy Mehan, Assistant 
Administrator for Water, Environmental Protection Agency). 
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by the EPA.96 The Corps’ definition of “waters of the United States” 
under section 404 of the CWA now reads: 
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, 
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, 
including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide; 
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands; 
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams 
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, 
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural 
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect 
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters: 
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign 
travelers for recreational or other purposes; or 
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken 
and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or 
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial 
purpose by industries in interstate commerce; 
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of 
the United States under the definition; 
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through 
(4) of this section; 
(6) The territorial seas; 
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are 
themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) 
of this section.97 
Both authorities also provide that “[w]aters of the United States do 
not include prior converted cropland” and that “[n]otwithstanding the 
determination of an area’s status as prior converted cropland by any 
other federal agency, for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final 
authority regarding Clean Water Act jurisdiction remains with EPA.”98 
                                                                                                             
 96 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (2006). 
 97 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2006). 
 98 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3). 
2007] Rapanos and CWA Jurisdiction 581 
The regulations also provide that “[w]aste treatment systems, including 
treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of CWA   
. . . are not waters of the United States.”99 Thus, there is only one 
definition today of “waters of the United States,” as broad as possible 
under the Commerce Clause, promulgated by the two bodies authorized 
to regulate those waters under the CWA.100 
II. RECENT LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE “PUSH-ME-PULL-YOU” OF CWA 
JURISDICTION 
The EPA and the Corps give the term “waters of the United States” 
an extraordinarily broad reading.101 The federal courts may not issue 
advisory opinions, however, because judicial power is constitutionally 
limited to deciding cases or controversies.102 Thus, the CWA’s 
administrators and regulated parties must wait for a contested case to 
reach the courts to learn the courts’ position on the matter of Clean 
Water Act jurisdiction. 
In the meantime, the EPA must respond to political and executive 
pressure and the Corps must update its rulings to conform to new EPA 
policies regarding CWA jurisdiction.103 These regulatory rulings are 
always subject to some level of judicial scrutiny.104 The sections that 
                                                                                                             
 99 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(7). 
 100 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); see also 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s). 
 101 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s). 
 102 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 103 Memorandum of Agreement between the Army Corps of Eng’rs & the Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, pt. II (Jan. 19, 1989), http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/guidance/404f.html 
(“It shall . . . be the policy of the Army and EPA that the Corps shall fully implement 
EPA guidance on determining the geographic extent of [CWA] section 404 jurisdiction 
and applicability of the 404(f) exemptions.”). 
 104 The Administrative Procedure Act, which governs judicial review of agency 
action, provides in relevant part: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms 
of an agency action. The reviewing court shall— 
. . . 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be— 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 
and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency 
hearing provided by statute; or 
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follow trace the recent legal dialogue between the judiciary and the 
Corps, and the inevitable confusion this dialogue has caused in the lower 
federal courts. 
A. The Supreme Court Affirms “Waters of the United States” Includes 
Adjacent Wetlands: Riverside Bayview 
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview held that Clean 
Water Act jurisdiction included wetlands adjacent to traditional 
navigable waters.105 The Court noted that the borders of wetlands often 
could not readily be distinguished from the navigable waters that fed into 
them.106 The Court also noted, importantly, that Corps expertise should 
weigh heavily in these types of scientific decisions.107 Although this 
decision appears to be a victory for the Corps, in later years Riverside 
Bayview would be used to argue for limitations on CWA jurisdiction. 
In Riverside Bayview, a development corporation owned “80 acres 
of low-lying, marshy land near the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb 
County, Michigan.”108 In preparation for building a housing development 
on this marshy land, the corporation piled a significant amount of fill 
without first obtaining a permit under § 404 of the Clean Water Act.109 
The Corps sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan to enjoin the corporation from filling in their 
wetlands without a permit.110 The District court held that the CWA 
applied to the company’s land and the Corps had jurisdiction over it.111 
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding the wetlands were not “adjacent 
to navigable waters.”112 The court based its opinion on the fact that the 
area did not support the type of aquatic vegetation that requires frequent 
                                                                                                             
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de 
novo by the reviewing court. 
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
 105 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985). 
 106 Id. at 132 (“In determining the limits of its power to regulate discharges under the 
[CWA], the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land 
begins. Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy task: the transition from 
water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one.”). 
 107 Id. at 134 (“In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by 
the [CWA] itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable 
waters, the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their 
adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands 
may be defined as waters under the [CWA].”). 
 108 Id. at 124. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 125. 
 112 Id. 
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flooding.113 The court noted that a broader reading of CWA jurisdiction 
would violate the takings doctrine.114 The court also found that Congress 
did not contemplate giving the Corps jurisdiction over wetlands that were 
not flooded by nearby navigable waters.115 
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.116 First, the Court 
noted there was no inherent takings problem, stating that “[w]e have 
frequently suggested that governmental land-use regulation may under 
extreme circumstances amount to a ‘taking’ of the affected property.”117  
The Court noted that “we have made it quite clear that the mere assertion 
of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a 
regulatory taking.”118 The Court noted that “[a] requirement that a person 
obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her property 
does not itself ‘take’ the property in any sense.”119 Finally, the Court 
noted that federal law requires the government to compensate private 
landowners and that the mere specter of a takings problem does not 
justify curtailing Clean Water Act jurisdiction.120 
Next, the Riverside Bayview Court turned to section 323.2(c)’s 
plain language and found the corporation’s property constituted a 
“wetland.”121 The regulatory language stated that ground water may 
                                                                                                             
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 126. 
 117 Id. (emphasis added). 
 118 Id. (“[O]ur general approach [is] . . . that the application of land-use regulations to 
a particular piece of property is a taking only ‘if the ordinance does not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his 
land.’” (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); see Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 293-297 (1981). 
 119 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 127 (“[A]fter all, the very existence of a permit 
system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the 
property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable 
uses available to the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is 
to prevent ‘economically viable’ use of the land in question can it be said that a taking 
has occurred.”). 
 120 Id. at 128 (“Because the Tucker Act, which presumptively supplies a means of 
obtaining compensation for any taking that may occur through the operation of a federal 
statute, is available to provide compensation for takings that may result from the Corps’ 
exercise of jurisdiction over wetlands, the Court of Appeals’ fears that application of the 
Corps’ permit program might result in a taking did not justify the court in adopting a 
more limited view of the Corps’ authority than the terms of the relevant regulation might 
otherwise support.” (citations omitted)). 
 121 Id. at 129 (“Wetlands . . . are defined as lands that are ‘inundated or saturated by 
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under 
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in 
saturated soil conditions.’”) (quoting 33 C.F.R.§ 323.2(c) (1985)). 
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support aquatic vegetation and trigger CWA jurisdiction.122 The Court 
noted that the land in question supported the type of aquatic vegetation 
outlined in the regulatory language.123 The Court noted that nothing in 
the regulatory language says that the wetland must be flooded by an 
adjacent body of water as the circuit court stated.124 Further, the Court 
noted the “frequent flooding” requirement injected by the circuit court 
reinstated the exact regulatory structure that the Corps rejected in 
1976.125 The Court found that the circuit court’s construction of CWA 
jurisdiction was invalid.126 
The Court then found that the corporation’s wetlands were 
“adjacent” to a navigable water under section 323.2.127 The wetland’s 
aquatic vegetation extended to Black Creek, which was a navigable 
waterway.128 The Court found the corporation’s wetland was part of the 
“waters of the United States” as defined under the CWA and subject to 
Corps jurisdiction.129 
Finally, the Court determined the Corps acted reasonably within the 
Act by exercising jurisdiction over wetlands that are “adjacent to but not 
regularly flooded by rivers, streams, and other hydrographic features 
more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters.’”130 First, the Court noted it 
was not an easy task for the Corps to determine where water ends and 
solid ground begins.131 The Court found the Corps appropriately looked 
to legislative history and the underlying policies of the CWA for 
guidance.132 The Court noted that neither source was clear.133 However, 
the Court found that when taken together, the sources supported the 
Corps’ determination of the corporation’s adjacent wetlands as “waters” 
within the meaning of the Clean Water Act.134 
The CWA’s objective, the Court noted, is “‘to restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.’”135 The Court observed that Congress intended “integrity” under 
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 123 Id. at 130. 
 124 Id. at 129. 
 125 Id. at 130. 
 126 Id. (“In fashioning its own requirement of ‘frequent flooding’ the Court of Appeals 
improperly reintroduced into the regulation precisely what the Corps had excised.”). 
 127 Id. at 131. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 132. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251). 
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the Clean Water Act to mean “‘a condition in which the natural structure 
and function of ecosystems [are] maintained.’”136 The Court also noted 
that Congress recognized that protection of aquatic ecosystems demands 
broad federal jurisdiction because “‘[water] moves in hydrologic cycles 
and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the 
source.’”137 Further, the Court explained that “the [CWA]’s definition of 
‘navigable waters’ as ‘the waters of the United States’ makes it clear that 
the term ‘navigable’ as used in the [CWA] is of limited import.138 
The Court noted that, following the EPA’s lead, the Corps stated 
the following in its 1977 rulemaking: 
The regulation of activities that cause water pollution cannot 
rely on . . . artificial lines . . . but must focus on all waters that 
together form the entire aquatic system. Water moves in 
hydrologic cycles, and the pollution of this part of the aquatic 
system . . . will affect the water quality of the other waters within 
that aquatic system. 
For this reason, the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction 
under [s]ection 404 must include any adjacent wetlands that form 
the border of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters of 
the United States, as these wetlands are part of this aquatic 
system.139 
The Riverside Bayview Court accepted the Corps’ justification.140 The 
Court concluded that it was not unreasonable that the Corps’ scientific 
judgment would produce the legal judgment that adjacent wetlands are 
“waters” under the CWA, given the breadth of regulatory authority 
contemplated by the Clean Water Act and the inherent problems in 
defining precise boundaries of waters subject to regulation.141 
The Court further accepted that, even if the water in the wetlands 
did not come from an adjacent body of open water, jurisdiction applies 
because the water from the wetlands could still have a tendancy to drain 
into those open waters.142 The Court further found that the Corps had 
reasonably determined such wetlands may serve to filter and purify such 
water, which provided a valid basis to deny a building permit to the 
                                                                                                             
 136 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76 (1972)). 
 137 Id. at 133 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1972)). 
 138 Id.; see S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.); see also 118 CONG. REC. 
33,756-57 (1972). 
 139 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133-34 (quoting Regulatory Programs of the Corps 
of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,128 (July 19, 1977)) (emphasis added). 
 140 Id. at 134. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
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corporation.143 Moreover, the Court accepted the Corps’ reasonable 
determination that such waters trapped in wetlands may slow the 
drainage to lakes, rivers and streams, thus preventing flooding and 
erosion.144 Finally, the Court accepted the Corps’ reasonable 
determination that adjacent wetlands “may ‘serve significant natural 
biological functions, including food chain production, general habitat, 
and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic . . . 
species.’”145 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Riverside Bayview opinion 
was that the Court gave great weight to the scientific expertise of the 
Army Corps of Engineers. In its unwillingness to substitute its judgment 
for that of the Corps, the Court found not only the Corps’ interpretation 
of the CWA was entitled to Chevron deference, but also that the Corps’ 
interpretation was reasonable.  This exercise of deference would stand in 
stark contrast to later opinions, particularly in Rapanos v. United 
States.146 In the meantime, however, the administrators had no reason to 
believe the Supreme Court would question their authority. As a result, 
they forged ahead with bold jurisdictional rulings under the Clean Water 
Act.147 
B. The Corps Further Expands CWA Jurisdiction: The “Migratory Bird 
Rule” and “Ephemeral Streams” 
Buoyed perhaps by the 1985 Riverside Bayview opinion, the Army 
Corps issued a final ruling the following year. In what has been dubbed 
the “Migratory Bird Rule,” the Corps announced that its jurisdiction 
under Clean Water Act extended to intrastate waters that, inter alia, 
provide habitat for migratory birds.148 The Corps based its ruling on an 
EPA regulation stating the waters of the United States included those: 
                                                                                                             
 143 Id.; see 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b) (2006) (authorizing the Corps to consider effect on 
wetlands when issuing building permits, including wetlands which serve “significant 
water purification functions”). 
 144 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134; see 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2)(iv)-(v) (2006). 
 145 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134-35 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2)(i) (1985)). 
 146 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); see also Solid Waste Agency of 
N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). In 1985, the year 
Riverside Bayview was decided, the Supreme Court consisted of Chief Justice Burger and 
Associate Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, O’Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, 
and White. In 2006, Rapanos was decided by a Supreme Court consisting of Chief Justice 
Roberts and Associate Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, Stevens, 
Souter, and Thomas. Only two Justices remained from the Riverside Bayview Court: 
Justices Stevens and O’Connor. 
 147 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 148 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 
41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
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(a) Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by 
Migratory Bird Treaties; or 
(b) Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory 
birds which cross state lines; or 
(c) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered 
species; or 
(d) Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.149 
The Corps may not have considered this statement of jurisdiction 
farfetched. Indeed, no fewer than two circuit courts that considered the 
question upheld the Migratory Bird Rule.150 In fact, the regulation stood 
unmolested until the Supreme Court invalidated it fifteen years later.151 
In the year prior to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the 
Migratory Bird Rule, the Corps issued another final rule.152 This 
regulation asserted CWA jurisdiction over waters with no constant 
flow.153 The ruling stated that the “waters of the United States” included 
“ephemeral streams,” “drainage ditches,” and “tributaries” with a 
perceptible “ordinary high water mark.”154 The ruling cited to the 
existing definition of “ordinary high water mark,” identified by a “line on 
the shore established by the fluctuations of water” and could be indicated 
by a “clear, natural line,” or “shelving, changes in character of soil, 
destruction of . . . vegetation, the presence of litter and debris, or other 
appropriate means.”155 The Supreme Court later characterized the ruling 
as “extend[ing] ‘the waters of the United States’ to . . . any land feature 
over which rainwater or drainage passes and leaves a visible mark.”156 
These two broad rulings created a framework for resistance from 
the Supreme Court and ensuing confusion among the circuit courts. The 
Court struck down the Migratory Bird Rule, holding that the CWA did 
not grant the Corps jurisdiction over isolated intrastate waters.157 Some 
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 150 See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990); see also 
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm’r, United States E.P.A., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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U.S. 159 (2001). 
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courts, however, interpreted the holding to mean that the CWA granted 
jurisdiction only over waters that had a significant physical connection to 
navigable waters, as in Riverside Bayview.158 This disparity in 
interpretation among the lower courts created a circuit split that has yet 
to heal.159 
C. The Supreme Court Shoots Down the Migratory Bird Rule: SWANCC 
In 2001, the Supreme Court issued its first decision that 
categorically limited the Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water 
Act.160 The Corps, the Court reasoned, had gone beyond its 
Congressional mandate in enacting the Migratory Bird Rule.161 The 
Court held that the goal of protecting migratory birds’ habitat was 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction, and that the CWA required some 
“nexus” to navigable waters.162 
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”), a group of suburban Chicago 
municipalities had selected an abandoned sand and gravel pit as a solid 
waste disposal site.163 The pit featured excavation trenches that had 
evolved into permanent and seasonal ponds.164 The Chicago District of 
the Army Corps of Engineers determined that it had jurisdiction under 
subpart (b) of the Migratory Bird Rule and required the municipalities to 
apply for a landfill permit.165 The Corps denied the permit because of the 
municipalities’ failure to address certain requirements under section 404 
of the CWA.166 The municipalities brought suit under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, and the district court granted summary judgment to the 
Corps on the jurisdictional issue.167 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, 
holding that the Corps had jurisdiction under the cumulative impact 
doctrine of the Commerce Clause and the Migratory Bird Rule to 
regulate the sand and gravel pit, and as a threshold matter, the EPA’s 
Migratory Bird Rule was a reasonable interpretation of its jurisdiction 
under section 404 of the CWA.168 
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The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in a 5-4 
decision.169 The Court reasoned that the EPA’s Migratory Bird Rule 
failed on constitutional grounds, including significant impingement of 
the states’ traditional and primary power over land and water use.170 In 
doing so, the SWANCC Court read the Clean Water Act conservatively to 
avoid significant constitutional and federalism questions.171 The 
SWANCC Court also rejected the Corps’ request for administrative 
deference, a decision that stands in stark contrast to that of the Riverside 
Bayview Court discussed supra.172 
The SWANCC Court highlighted the importance of navigation to 
federal jurisdiction under the CWA.173 The Court first reaffirmed that 
“navigable” represented a lower standard than “navigable in fact” by 
observing that “[w]e said in Riverside Bayview Homes that the word 
‘navigable’ in the statute was of ‘limited effect’ and went on to hold that 
[section] 404(a) extended to nonnavigable wetlands adjacent to open 
waters.”174 However, the SWANCC Court hinted that it would limit the 
Corps by stating “it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite 
another to give it no effect whatever.”175 
Accordingly, the SWANCC Court refused to write “navigable 
waters” out of the statute and observed that “[t]he term ‘navigable’ has at 
least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority 
for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or 
had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.”176 
The SWANCC Court held that “nonnagivable, isolated, intrastate waters” 
were not a part of the “waters of the United States.”177 Through this lens, 
the SWANCC Court majority viewed the isolated, sand-and-gravel pit in 
Illinois. The Court found that because the pit lacked a connection with or 
adjacency to a navigable or non-navigable interstate water, it fell outside 
the reach of the Clean Water Act.178 Unfortunately, the SWANCC Court 
majority failed to articulate a usable test for lower courts to apply to 
future cases, and the holding was open to interpretation. 
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The Fifth Circuit interpreted the opinion expansively to mean that 
waters must be “truly adjacent” to qualify for Corps jurisdiction.179 Other 
circuits took a very limited view of the holding, applying SWANCC to 
instances involving truly isolated, intrastate waters.180 With no 
affirmative test and little guidance going forward, the circuit courts 
struggled to apply the SWANCC decision. 
D. After SWANCC: The Flock Scatters 
When Congress enacted the federal pollution control CWA 
amendments in the 1970s, it delegated responsibility for determining 
CWA jurisdiction to the EPA and the Corps.181 As discussed supra, 
Congress indicated in their debates that it intended for the EPA and the 
Corps to interpret their jurisdiction under the CWA to the outer limits of 
the Commerce Clause.182 However, Congress placed a jurisdictional limit 
in the CWA with statutory language limiting jurisdiction to navigable 
waters.183 Under these conflicting political messages, the Corps was 
forced to feel their way to the limits of their jurisdiction.184 When the 
Supreme Court finally struck down one of the Corps’ rulings, the courts 
below had little guidance other than Riverside Bayview to aid in deciding 
future cases.185 Thus, it should come as little surprise that the circuits 
split almost immediately. 
1. The Fifth Circuit: CWA Jurisdiction Extends to Wetlands “Truly 
Adjacent” to Navigable Waters 
In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., a decision reached the same 
year as SWANCC, the Fifth Circuit applied the SWANCC holding very 
aggressively.186 The Rice Court noted that “under [SWANCC], it appears 
that a body of water is subject to regulation under the CWA if the body 
of water is actually navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable 
water.”187 The Rice Court attempted, as a matter of first impression, to 
determine whether groundwater was protected under the Oil Protection 
Act, the jurisdictional component of which, the court determined, was 
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identical to the CWA’s.188 The court determined the only discharges in 
question were onto dry land; therefore, the court did not reach the 
question of whether a non-adjacent tributary would be protected.189 
However, the Rice Court signaled its broad reading of SWANCC by 
stating “a body of water is protected under the Act only if it is actually 
navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water.”190 Thus, 
had the Rice Court reached the question, the court would likely have 
ruled that a non-navigable secondary or tertiary tributary, or a non-
adjacent wetland with a hydrological connection to a navigable water by 
way of another body of water, would not be protected under the Clean 
Water Act. 
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit again addressed the CWA’s 
jurisdictional reach.191 In In re Needham, the court noted that at least two 
sister circuits read CWA jurisdiction broadly to cover “all waters, 
excluding groundwater, that have any hydrological connection with 
‘navigable water.’”192 The Needham Court stated, however, that “[i]n our 
view, this definition is unsustainable under SWANCC.”193 The Needham 
Court, contrary to the Riverside Bayview Court, opined that the Corps’ 
regulation was “not entitled to Chevron deference” because, if applied 
broadly, CWA jurisdiction would be pushed “to the outer limits of the 
Commerce Clause and raise serious constitutional questions.”194 The 
Needham Court substituted its judgment for that of the Corps and 
concluded that the term “adjacent” requires a “significant measure of 
proximity,” and “including all ‘tributaries’ as ‘navigable waters’ would 
negate Rice’s adjacency requirement, and extend [EPA jurisdiction] 
beyond the limits . . . in SWANCC.”195 Following the Fifth Circuit’s own 
precedent, the Needham Court held that the EPA had jurisdiction only 
over “navigable-in-fact waters or . . . non-navigable waters (or wetlands) 
that are truly adjacent to an open body of navigable water.”196 
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2. The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits: CWA Jurisdiction 
Extends to Wetlands with “Some Nexus” to Navigable Waters 
Two years after SWANCC, the Fourth Circuit held in United States 
v. Deaton that the Corps’ interpretation of its own regulations merited a 
combination of Seminole Rock and Chevron deference.197 The Deaton 
Court found that a ditch that eventually drained into navigable waters 
could reasonably be a “tributary” under the Corps’ regulations, and thus 
the Corp could properly assert jurisdiction over the wetland in question 
that was adjacent to such a ditch.198 The Deaton Court noted, “we do not 
read SWANCC to hold that the [more narrow] 1974 regulations represent 
the only permissible interpretation of the Clean Water Act.”199 
Later that same year, in Treacy v. Newdunn Associates, L.L.P., the 
Fourth Circuit held that Corps’ jurisdiction extends to all tributaries, 
regardless of whether they are man-made.200 The Treacy Court noted that 
the question should be whether the CWA’s goal of protecting the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters is 
being undermined, not whether the body of water is man-made or 
natural.201 The court stated that SWANCC required that a wetland be 
“inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United States,” and that 
only the Corps’ attempts at jurisdiction over waters that had “no 
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hydrological connection whatsoever to navigable waters” would fail 
under SWANCC.202 
In the Sixth Circuit, six years before the SWANCC decision was 
handed down, Michigander John Rapanos was convicted of unlawfully 
filling wetlands in violation of the Clean Water Act.203 In 1997, Rapanos 
appealed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.204 Rapanos appealed 
a second time, and this time the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit to review in light of SWANCC.205 
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court.206 The district 
court found that because Rapanos’s wetlands “were not ‘directly adjacent 
to navigable waters,’ the government could not regulate them.”207 On 
appeal, the Sixth Circuit disagreed.208 The court aligned itself with the 
Fourth Circuit, which stated that wetlands draining into a ditch that 
passes through other waterways to a navigable-in-fact water formed a 
sufficient nexus to navigable waters to confer Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction.209 The Sixth Circuit stated that “[b]ecause the wetlands are 
adjacent to the [Labozinski] Drain and there exists a hydrological 
connection among [Rapanos’] wetlands, the Drain, and the [navigable] 
Kawkawlin River, we find an ample nexus to establish jurisdiction.210 
The court reversed the district court and reinstated Rapanos’ 
convictions.211 Rapanos would revisit the Supreme Court three years 
later; however, one should note that the Sixth Circuit gave SWANCC a 
much different reading than did the Fifth Circuit.212 
In the same year, the Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Rueth 
Development Co. that surface hydrological connection, no matter how 
attenuated, is sufficient for Corps jurisdiction under the CWA.213 The 
Rueth Court found sufficient nexus in wetlands “adjacent to an unnamed 
tributary of Dyer Ditch which is a tributary of Hard Ditch which is a 
tributary of the [navigable] Little Calumet River.”214 Like the Sixth 
Circuit, the court aligned itself with the Fourth Circuit in holding that 
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“adjacency” is established by a showing of almost any surface 
hydrological connection.215 
The same year that the Supreme Court issued the SWANCC ruling, 
the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of jurisdiction under the Clean 
Water Act in Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District.216 The 
Headwaters Court held that where there was a surface hydrologic 
connection, even if intermittent, whereby a waterway was capable of 
carrying pollutants to other “waters of the United States,” it was a 
tributary to other waters of the United States and fell within CWA 
jurisdiction under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).217 The Headwaters Court 
believed that SWANCC had no bearing on their decision because the 
irrigation ditches in question were not isolated.218 
In each of the decisions above, the circuit courts dealt with the issue 
of adjacency on a local level. Each circuit developed their own standard 
for federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction under section 404, Riverside 
Bayview, and SWANCC.219 Some circuits, including the Sixth Circuit, 
continued to read CWA jurisdiction very broadly.220 The tension among 
these broad interpretations of CWA jurisdiction, issues of federalism, 
and private ownership interests, exacerbated by the cost of the permit 
program to regulated individuals, would stretch the Clean Water Act to 
its limits. In the absence of congressional action addressing the 
jurisdictional issue, the Supreme Court weighed in once more.221 
E. The Supreme Court Muddies the Waters: Rapanos v. United States’ 4-
1-4 Split 
As discussed supra, the United States brought suit under section 
404 of the Clean Water Act against John Rapanos, a private developer 
who filled Michigan wetlands lying near ditches or man-made drains that 
eventually emptied into traditional navigable waters.222 In a separate 
action, private developers, the Carabells, brought suit against United 
States for denying their application under section 404 to fill their 
Michigan wetlands, which were separated from a drainage ditch by an 
impermeable berm.223 In both cases, the district court found federal 
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jurisdiction over the wetlands under the CWA.224 In the first case, the 
district court found that Rapanos’ wetlands were “adjacent to other 
waters of the United States.”225 In the second, the district court found the 
Carabells’ land was also “adjacent to neighboring tributaries of navigable 
waters and has a significant nexus to ‘waters of the United States.’”226 
In Rapanos, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court, stating there 
were “hydrological connections between all three sites and 
corresponding adjacent tributaries of navigable waters” sufficient for 
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.227 The Sixth Circuit also 
affirmed Carabells, stating that the wetland was “adjacent” to navigable 
waters.228 The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases to decide 
“whether these wetlands constitute ‘waters of the United States’ under 
the [CWA], and if so, whether the [CWA] is constitutional.”229 
In Rapanos, the Supreme Court began with factual observations 
about the Rapanos sites.230 The Supreme Court noted that “[t]he wetlands 
at the Salzburg site are connected to a man-made drain, which drains into 
Hoppler Creek, which flows into the [navigable] Kawkawlin River, 
which empties into Saginaw Bay and Lake Huron.”231 Furthermore, 
“[t]he wetlands at the Hines site are connect to . . . the ‘Rose Drain,’ 
which has a surface connection to the [navigable] Tittabawassee 
River.”232 The Court went on to explain that “the wetlands at the Pine 
River site have a surface connection to the [navigable] Pine River, which 
flows into Lake Huron.”233 The Court also noted that “[i]t is not clear 
whether the connections between [the Rapanos’] wetlands and the nearby 
drains and ditches are continuous or intermittent, or whether the nearby 
drains and ditches contain continuous or merely occasional flows of 
water.”234 
The Rapanos Court continued with observations regarding the 
Carabells’ site. “A man-made drainage ditch runs along one side of the 
[Carabells’] wetland,” the Court held, “separated from it by a 4-foot-
wide man-made berm.”235 The Court continued that “[t]he ditch empties 
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into another ditch or a drain, which connects to Auvase Creek, which 
empties into Lake St. Clair.”236 The Court proceeded to evaluate federal 
jurisdiction over both parties’ sites under the plain language of the Clean 
Water Act, congressional intent in enacting the CWA and its 
constitutionality.237 In Rapanos, the Supreme Court ultimately vacated 
the Sixth Circuit judgment and remanded.238 
1. The Plurality: Riverside Bayview and the 1954 Webster’s 
Dictionary Definition of “Waters” Controls; States to Retain 
Primary Pollution and Land/Water Use Responsibilities and Rights 
The Rapanos plurality, written by Justice Scalia and joined by three 
other Justices, began by reiterating the well-settled idea that “navigable 
waters” under the plain language of the CWA is broader than traditional 
navigable waters.239 The plurality opined that “waters of the United 
States” does not include channels containing intermittent or ephemeral 
flow.240 Relatively continuous flow, the plurality stated, is a necessary 
condition for qualification as a “water.”241 A more expansive reading by 
the Corps, the Rapanos plurality opined, would defeat the preservation of 
“‘the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, reduce, 
and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use . . . of 
land and water resources.’”242 The Court referred to its decision in 
SWANCC, stating an expansive reading of the regulations would “result 
in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power 
over land and water use.”243 
In developing its working definition of “waters,” the plurality 
referred to a 1954 edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary.244 
According to the fifty-three-year-old definition of the word “waters,”245 
the Court held that “the phrase ‘the waters of the United States’ includes 
only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies 
of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary 
parlance as ‘streams[,]’ . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’” and cannot 
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include “channels through which water flows intermittently or 
ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for 
rainfall.”246 Thus, the Court concluded, “[t]he Corps’ expansive 
interpretation of the ‘waters of the United States’ is thus not ‘based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.’”247 
The plurality opined that to be subject to jurisdiction under the 
CWA, a wetland must have a continuous surface connection to waters of 
the United States.248 Wetlands that only have an “intermittent, physically 
remote hydrologic connection to ‘waters of the United States’” lack the 
“significant nexus” required by SWANCC.249 Thus, the Rapanos plurality 
held that establishing whether wetlands are covered under the CWA 
requires two findings: First, the adjacent channel must contain a 
“relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate 
navigable waters,” and second, that the wetland has “a continuous 
surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine 
where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”250 
The Rapanos plurality found that the Sixth Circuit applied an 
incorrect standard to determine whether the wetlands at issue were 
“waters of the United States.”251 Because of this error and the paucity of 
the record, the plurality voted to remand the cases for further 
proceedings.252 Justice Kennedy joined the plurality in its judgment only, 
giving the Rapanos Court the fifth vote it needed.253 
2. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence: CWA Requires a “Significant 
Nexus” to Navigable Waters 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos found that the 
Sixth Circuit correctly recognized that a water or wetland constitutes 
“navigable waters” under the CWA if it possesses a “significant nexus” 
to waters that are navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so 
made,254 but that it had not considered all the factors necessary to 
determine that the lands in question had, or did not have, the requisite 
                                                                                                             
 246 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225. 
 247 Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)); see supra 
note 197 for a discussion of Chevron deference. 
 248 Id. at 2226. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. at 2227. 
 251 Id. at 2235. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. at 2236. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 254 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159, 167, 172 (2001). 
598 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:565 
nexus.255 The nexus required, Justice Kennedy opined, “must be assessed 
in terms of the [CWA]’s goals and purposes.”256 Justice Kennedy 
observed that “Congress enacted the law to ‘restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’”257 
Congress pursued that objective, Justice Kennedy noted, “by restricting 
dumping and filling in ‘navigable waters.’”258 The Corps’ recognition 
that wetlands can perform critical functions related to the integrity of 
other waters, such as pollutant trapping, flood control, and runoff 
storage, serves as the rationale behind the CWA’s wetlands regulation.259 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence articulated a test for federal 
jurisdiction over wetlands under the Clean Water Act: 
[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the 
statutory phrase “navigable waters,” if the wetlands, either alone 
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, 
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as 
“navigable.” When, in contrast, wetlands’ effects on water 
quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone 
fairly encompassed by the statutory term “navigable waters.”260 
Thus, for CWA jurisdiction to attach under the Kennedy Test, there must 
be a substantial nexus between the wetlands in question and the 
chemical, physical, or biological properties of the open waters into which 
those wetlands flow. 
Justice Kennedy opined that the “Corps’ theory of jurisdiction in 
these consolidated cases—adjacency to tributaries, however remote and 
insubstantial—raises concerns that go beyond the Riverside Bayview 
holding.”261 Absent more specific regulations, Justice Kennedy stated, 
“the Corps must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis 
when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable 
tributaries” to avoid unreasonable applications of the CWA.262 Although 
Justice Kennedy found that “the record contains evidence suggesting the 
possible existence of a significant nexus,” the concurrence also found 
that “neither the agency nor the reviewing courts properly considered the 
issue.”263 Therefore, the concurrence recommended that the case be 
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remanded for further consideration under the “controlling legal 
standard.”264 
3. Justice Stevens’ Dissent: Chevron Deference Applies 
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices, 
also found that Riverside Bayview “squarely controls these cases.”265 
Justice Stevens noted that the question there was framed as whether the 
CWA “authorizes the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from 
the Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to 
navigable bodies of water and their tributaries.”266 Applying Chevron 
deference the Corps’ interpretation of their jurisdiction to include such 
wetlands in their interpretation of “waters of the United States,” the 
Riverside Bayview Court found such an interpretation was permissible.267 
Turning to the cases at hand, Justice Stevens opined that in these 
cases, which concern “wetlands that are adjacent to ‘navigable bodies of 
water or their tributaries,’”268 the Corps had again “reasonably 
interpreted its jurisdiction to cover non-isolated wetlands.”269 Justice 
Stevens further noted that the Riverside Bayview Court found there is a 
presumption that wetlands adjacent to tributaries possess sufficient nexus 
to confer Corps jurisdiction.270 Observing that the Corps has 
implemented such jurisdiction for over thirty years, Justice Stevens 
opined that any change to that jurisdiction is properly left to “Congress 
or the Corps rather than to the Judiciary,” noting that “[u]nless and until 
[adversely affected persons] succeed in convincing Congress (or the 
Corps) that clean water is less important today than it was in the 1970s, 
we continue to owe deference to regulations . . . that all of the Justices on 
the Court in 1985 recognized in Riverside Bayview.”271 
Justice Stevens also found the plurality’s definition of “waters” 
problematic, both logically and with respect to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.272 Justice Stevens also found problematic the canonic 
construction the plurality relied upon to support its position that land use 
regulation was a right, reserved to the States, that the Corps was not 
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empowered to overcome,273 and that “adjacent” waters have a surface 
hydrological connection requirement found nowhere in the Corps’ 
regulations.274 Justice Stevens observed that “[b]ecause there is 
ambiguity in the phrase ‘waters of the United States’ and because 
interpreting it broadly . . . advances the purpose of the [CWA], the 
Corps’ approach [of regulating pollutants as they enter ditches or 
streams] should command [Supreme Court] deference.”275 Justice 
Stevens likewise found Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” 
requirement a superfluous addition to the Corps’ regulations, particularly 
in light of the Riverside Bayview bright-line presumption that 
nonadjacent wetlands are sufficiently connected to the waters of the 
United States to confer Corps jurisdiction.276 
4. Justice Breyer’s Dissent: The Corps Retains Control through 
Rulemaking 
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer found that Congress 
“intended to fully exercise its relevant Commerce Clause powers” by 
using the expansive term “waters of the United States” in the Clean 
Water Act and leaving it to the Army Corps of Engineers to create a 
scientifically workable definition.277 Justice Breyer further found that, 
although the Rapanos Court wrote an unnecessary “nexus” requirement 
into the Clean Water Act, the Corps had plenary power to define the 
term.278 Justice Breyer observed that if and when the Corps enacted such 
a regulation, “the courts must give those regulations appropriate 
deference [under Chevron].”279 
F. Federal Court Inconsistency: The Next Wave 
The 4-1-4 split decision in Rapanos signaled to the lower courts 
that even the Supreme Court was at odds over the issue of Clean Water 
Act jurisdiction. Worse, the split presented the lower courts with 
logistical problems in discerning the precedential holding, if indeed there 
was one. With several cases in the pipe, the circuits took on the 
Herculean task of answering the question: “What next?” 
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1. The Seventh Circuit Adopts the Kennedy Test 
Immediately after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rapanos, 
it remanded United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc. to the Seventh 
Circuit for further proceedings and factual findings.280 The Seventh 
Circuit remanded Gerke Excavating to the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Wisconsin with instructions to proceed 
consistent with Justice Kennedy’s opinion.281 The Seventh Circuit stated 
that Justice Kennedy’s test was “the narrowest ground to which the 
majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to choose.”282 
Therefore, the court concluded, the Kennedy Test governed future 
proceedings.283 The court thus remanded to the district court with 
instructions to follow the standard Justice Kennedy proposed in his 
Rapanos concurrence.284 
2. The Ninth Circuit Misapplies the Kennedy Test 
The same summer the Rapanos decision was filed, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the Corps’ jurisdiction over Basalt Pond, a “rock quarry 
pit that had filled with water from the surrounding aquifer, located next 
to the [navigable] Russian River,” in Northern California River Watch v. 
City of Healdsburg.285 The River Watch court based its conclusion, 
however, on a misapplication of the Kennedy Test. The River Watch 
court held the pond fell within CWA jurisdiction because it found a 
“significant nexus” to a navigable river. However, the River Watch 
court’s reasoning failed to consider Justice Kennedy’s observation that 
“[a]s applied to wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, the Corps’ 
. . . assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable under the 
Act by showing adjacency alone. That is the holding of Riverside 
Bayview.”286 Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied the Kennedy Test 
needlessly. 
3. The Northern District of Texas Refuses to Apply the Kennedy 
Test 
In the same year as the Rapanos decision, the Northern District of 
Texas refused to even attempt the Kennedy Test. 287 In United States v. 
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Chevron Pipe Line Co., a recent decision that released a large oil 
corporation from civil liability under the CWA for discharging crude oil 
into a creek and streambed, the district court stated flatly that “[b]ecause 
[Justice] Kennedy failed to elaborate on the ‘significant nexus’ required, 
this Court will look to the prior reasoning in this circuit.”288 The Chevron 
court somewhat surprisingly rejected the Kennedy Test wholesale and 
relied solely on pre-Rapanos Fifth Circuit decisions and the non-
controlling Rapanos plurality to find that the creek and streambed were 
not navigable waters of the United States.289 
4. The Middle District of Florida Applies Both the Plurality and the 
Kennedy Tests 
In United States v. Evans, the Middle District of Florida solved the 
fragmented-court dilemma by applying both Rapanos’s plurality and 
Kennedy Tests and then taking an “either/or” approach to find Corps 
jurisdiction if either one or the other test was satisfied.290 The Evans 
Court noted this approach was “consistent with Justice Stevens’ 
[dissenting] opinion,” which advocated such an approach in dicta.291 
Indeed, the Evans Court’s approach would yield correct results under 
most circumstances. However, in rare instances where water possessed a 
slight surface hydrological connection and an insignificant nexus to 
navigable waters, this approach would incorrectly yield a finding of 
Corps jurisdiction over waters outside the scope of the Clean Water Act 
under Rapanos. 
III. ANALYSIS AND A DECENT PROPOSAL 
Congress expressly stated the Clean Water Act’s purpose is “to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the Nation’s waters.”292 In other words, Congress intended this 
legislation to control not only the physical navigability of the nation’s 
waters as commercial conduits, but also to control the purity of the 
nation’s waters threatened by widespread pollution. Seeing that the 
growing problem of pollution in our nation’s waterways created a 
national issue, both ideologically and physically, Congress sought to 
reverse the degradation of those waterways.293 
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However, Congress has severely undermined the stated objective of 
the Clean Water Act.294 First, it imposed upon the CWA’s administrators 
a geographical jurisdictional constraint, which bound the CWA’s ambit 
to the “waters of the United States.”295 This constraint made the stated 
objective nearly impossible and set its administrators up for conflict with 
the states and private landowners. Congress also indicated that the Clean 
Water Act be construed to the furthest possible reaches of the Commerce 
Clause, encouraging its administrators to act broadly.296 These 
conflicting messages have crippled the CWA’s chances for success by 
causing uncertainty in the Clean Water Act’s administrators and endless 
confusion in the courts and amongst the regulated individuals. 
It is well settled in our tripartite system of government that the 
judicial branch has power to resolve legislative uncertainty, limited in the 
case of congressional administrative delegation by the principle of 
intelligibility, whereby any agency must be given an “intelligible 
principle” under which to operate or the statute is invalid.297 The 
Supreme Court has not said that the Clean Water Act lacks such an 
intelligible principle. However, once the Supreme Court has spoken to 
resolve a legislative uncertainty, how shall those words be interpreted? 
Rapanos presents the lower courts with a particularly troublesome 
puzzle. Evidence has already shown that proceeding with litigation on a 
case-by-case basis produces inconsistent results.298 Justice Breyer 
suggested in his Rapanos dissent that the Corps has plenary power to 
define the waters of the United States scientifically, and thus resolve the 
jurisdictional question.299 However, there is no indication that the Court 
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would award such a definition any more deference under Chevron than it 
did in Rapanos. The remaining resolution for this problem is for 
Congress to revisit the CWA and restate its intent with a clear 
jurisdictional delegation. This section will address each option in turn. 
A. Navigating the Rapanos Opinion: Should Marks Apply? 
Supreme Court decisions are binding upon every lower court in the 
United States.300 Therefore, lower courts must discern the holding of 
every Supreme Court case carefully and precisely. When the Court’s 
opinion splinters, the task can be very difficult. When no opinion 
commands a majority of the Justices’ vote, as in Rapanos, which opinion 
controls? If all circuits cannot answer this threshold question in a single 
voice, future litigation on a case-by-case basis is not viable. In fact, as 
discussed supra, the circuits have already split on this issue.301 I suggest, 
however, that there is some value in examining the problems with 
interpreting Rapanos in more detail. 
The Supreme Court held in Marks v. United States that “[w]hen a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the 
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”302 In Rapanos, the plurality did 
not command the assent of five Justices; Justice Kennedy, who 
concurred in the plurality’s judgment, did not concur in the plurality’s 
rationale.303 Therefore, the plurality opinion by logic cannot be 
controlling. Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which commands the assent of 
five Justices, should control the lower courts’ decisions.304 
In a recent opinion, the Court observed that “[i]t does not seem 
‘useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when 
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it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have 
considered it.’”305 The Grutter Court followed a splintered opinion with 
no overlap in reasoning, like the one in Rapanos, without following 
Marks to its “utmost logical possibility.”306 Instead, the Grutter Court 
followed the rationale of one Justice’s opinion in concluding that student 
body diversity is a compelling state interest.307 The Supreme Court 
arguably has some latitude in following its own precedents. However, 
what are the lower courts to do with an imprecise or ambiguous Supreme 
Court decision? May they also take such liberties? 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens took a different approach 
than in Marks or Grutter.308 Justice Stevens opined that the Sixth Circuit 
should reinstate Rapanos’ judgment if either the plurality or the 
concurrence’s tests are met.309 Justice Stevens assumed that, in most 
cases, Justice Kennedy’s approach would control because it treats more 
of the Nation’s waters as within the Corps’ jurisdiction.310 Justice 
Stevens concluded that it was unlikely that a case will pass the plurality 
test but not Justice Kennedy’s, so in effect Justice Kennedy’s test would 
control.311 However, this unfair analysis forces the Corps to operate 
under the plurality’s more restrictive test, which did not garner a majority 
of the Justices’ votes.312 
Because both the Marks and Justice Stevens’ calculus of 
determining which, if any, of the Rapanos opinion controls are flawed, 
an alternate method is needed.313 Simply put, any case that satisfies 
Justice Kennedy’s test would garner at least five votes from the Rapanos 
Justices, that is, those of Justice Kennedy and the four dissenting 
Justices. Therefore, Justice Kennedy’s opinion should control in the 
lower courts. However, Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard, 
although arguably a more informed standard than the plurality or the 
dissent, may be particularly unworkable. Courts would have the burden 
of determining the level of “significance” of any nexus to the nation’s 
waters. This is a task for which the federal courts are ill suited and which 
is far better left to the scientific expertise of the EPA and the Army 
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Corps of Engineers, as Congress intended when it wisely delegated those 
duties in the early 1970s.314 
Regardless of whether the courts are the appropriate fora to decide 
Corp jurisdiction under the CWA, the circuit courts already disagree 
regarding whether Justice Kennedy’s opinion controls.315 This situation 
was predictable; the Supreme Court itself appears unable to distinguish 
which Rapanos opinion controls.316 Moreover, the inability of the circuit 
courts to agree on which opinion controls exposes Rapanos’s failure as a 
viable precedent. This complex split in the Supreme Court and its 
resulting ineffectiveness as meaningful precedent leaves the courts with 
little choice but to proceed through the fog without a compass. 
B. Steaming Forward: Three Possible Futures of the CWA 
After Rapanos, the courts, the Corps, and regulated individuals are 
left with no clear idea of how to proceed under section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act. If Congress fails to clarify the jurisdictional issue through 
legislation, two approaches remain. The Corps could promulgate even 
more rules than it already has, each one subject to scrutiny by the 
Supreme Court. Alternatively, both Congress and the Corps could do 
nothing and leave it to the courts to develop their own interpretations of 
CWA jurisdiction over time, with case law differing wildly among the 
circuits. The real solution is for Congress to eliminate the confusion they 
created with the geographical jurisdictional limitation in 1972 by 
revisiting the CWA and passing an amendment that definitively resolves 
the Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. 
1. Case-by-Case Adjudication: Standing Up in the Canoe 
Litigation on a case-by-case basis is the most inefficient, unstable, 
and often unfair method of resolving almost any legislative issue, 
certainly one as complex and far-reaching as jurisdiction under the Clean 
Water Act. Litigating the CWA on a case-by-case basis would force 
courts to adjudicate cases presenting issues well beyond their scientific 
expertise, and litigants would be at the mercy of a relatively uninformed 
adjudicative body. Furthermore, case law provides the least guidance to 
regulated parties, the EPA, and courts going forward. This situation is 
particularly true in the case of Rapanos, where the circuits seem unable 
to apply the decision consistently.317 Case-by-case litigation does nothing 
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to resolve confusion among the courts caused by the splintered Rapanos 
decision and creates more confusion as the split circuits look to each 
other for guidance. Moreover, ad hoc “regulation by litigation” is 
profoundly expensive, unpredictable, and unfair to the administrators of 
the CWA and regulated parties. Absent statutory certainty, courts need 
guidance from a united Supreme Court. The Rapanos decision did not 
produce such guidance; case-by-case litigation will only serve to 
exacerbate the problem. 
2. Agency Rulemaking: Anything More Than a Dagger Board? 
A rulemaking by the EPA or the Corps is a more stable, lasting, and 
informed method of regulatory clarification than quasi-rulemaking 
through adjudication. However, an explicit reinterpretation by the EPA 
or the Corps of its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act is still subject 
to review by the Supreme Court.318 In its current configuration, the High 
Court does not seem inclined to grant deference under Chevron that the 
executive branch requires, through the EPA or the Corps, to revise and 
clarify the jurisdictional issue.319 The weakness, therefore, lies within the 
language of the Clean Water Act itself. 
3. Legislative Amendment: Refitting the Ship 
Congressional revision of the Clean Water Act is the most stable 
and workable solution. Revising the CWA would remove discretion from 
its dual administration scheme and give weight to the CWA in the courts. 
Revision from the legislative branch would provide the EPA, the Corps, 
regulated parties, and federal courts with sorely needed and undeniable 
guidance more effectively than agency rulemaking. 
Congress passed the CWA over a presidential veto in 1972, and its 
34-year history seems to indicate its permanent place in the nation’s 
history.320 The Clean Water Act reportedly enjoys strong bipartisan 
congressional support, both currently and historically.321 If such a 
consensus exists, Congress may now be in a position to solve the CWA’s 
jurisdictional incongruity by changing its statutory language. Statutory 
revision may be the only way to ensure that the administrators can 
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execute the CWA in a manner that is true to its stated intent of 
comprehensive national pollution control.322 
C. A Decent Proposal: The Commerce Clause as an Independent Basis 
for Jurisdiction 
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 
commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), to protect the 
nation and its economy from the unintended consequences of known 
decline in water purity, physical waterways, and aquatic life.323 The 
CWA’s stated objective is “to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”324 On its face, 
the stated objective appears to have no connection whatsoever with the 
geographic location of navigable waters. 
As discussed above, Congress granted the Army Corps of 
Engineers jurisdiction over the nation’s waters under the RHA to protect, 
enhance, and develop navigable waters.325 It is understandable that 
Congress would seek to expand the Corps’ jurisdiction to administer the 
Clean Water Act, given the Corps’ expertise in the area of water 
management. However, it was not necessary for Congress to perpetuate 
in the Clean Water Act the doctrine of navigable servitude that anchored 
the RHA. Congress could have instead linked the CWA to the health of 
the nation’s waterways under its commerce power, as it did similarly 
when enacting the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), without a 
geographic jurisdictional limitation.326 In addition, Congress could have 
authorized the EPA to create a new sub-agency to administer the CWA’s 
permit program rather than delegate to the existing Corps of Engineers. 
Congress did not do either of these alternatives. As enacted, the 
CWA’s geographic link to “navigable waters” created confusion for the 
courts, the administrators of the Act, and the regulated parties.327 What 
constitutes a “navigable water” as contemplated by the Act? Where does 
such a water begin? Where does it end? What is the status of a tributary? 
How can the Corps effectively administer the CWA without some 
control over intrastate activities that significantly affect the waters of the 
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United States? Applying the existing doctrine of cumulative effects 
aggregation as it applies to the Commerce Clause to create new 
legislation could solve these questions and others. 
1. Contours of the Modern Commerce Clause: From Lopez to Raich 
In 1995, the Supreme Court set forth three categories of 
commercial activity subject to regulation by Congress under its 
commerce power in United States v. Lopez.328 These categories ensure a 
sufficient nexus between the subject of the legislation and Congress’s 
enumerated power to regulate commerce in order to maintain 
constitutionality. These categories have been refined over time, and are 
still in effect today. 
The Lopez Court first held that “Congress may regulate the use of 
the channels of interstate commerce.”329 Such channels include national 
roadways, airplane routes, oceans, lakes, rivers, and other maritime 
routes such as canals and locks. 330 They also include non-traditional 
channels such as telecommunication conduits.331 
Second, the Court held that “Congress is empowered to regulate 
and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”332 The Court 
noted that Congress may regulate such instrumentalities “even though 
the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”333 Relevant 
instrumentalities include local hotels and their employees,334 airplanes 
and their passengers, aircraft and destruction thereof,335 interstate 
shipments and theft thereof,336 and vehicles used in intrastate 
commerce.337 This category could easily be extended to residential 
developments, chartered fishing boats and their clients, passenger ships 
and their riders, pleasure boats and their owners, and naturalists, 
photographers, and hunters who cross state lines to engage in 
commercial activity. 
Finally, the Lopez Court held that “Congress’[s] commerce 
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that 
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substantially affect interstate commerce.”338 Examples include “intrastate 
coal mining[,] intrastate extortionate credit transactions, restaurants 
utilizing substantial interstate supplies, inns and hotels catering to 
interstate guests, and production and consumption of homegrown 
wheat.”339 Other examples include intrastate on-site waste disposal340 and 
building a state-of-the-art hospital in the habitat of a local fly protected 
under the ESA.341 
The Lopez Court stated that “[t]hese examples are by no means 
exhaustive, but the pattern is clear. Where economic activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that 
activity will be sustained.”342 The Lopez Court thus held that Congress 
did not have commerce clause authority to regulate possession of 
firearms in a school zone because neither possessing a firearm nor being 
in a school zone was economic in nature.343  Five years after Lopez, the 
Court reaffirmed its position in United States v. Morrison, a case 
addressing the constitutionality of federal legislation protecting women 
from violence.344 The Morrison Court found that gender-based violence 
was not an economic activity. The Court concluded, therefore, that 
Congress had exceeded its commerce power in penning the Violence 
Against Women Act. 
The Lopez analysis survives today and Supreme Court decisions 
subsequent to Lopez have continued to require a significant connection to 
commerce to validate federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. 
The Lopez “substantial effect on interstate commerce” test is fairly easy 
to meet in many cases. Internet pornography regulation is valid under the 
Lopez “channels of interstate commerce” test. Airplanes are regulated 
under the Lopez “instrumentalities of interstate commerce” test. 
Regulation of the sale of harmful drugs is valid under the Lopez 
“substantial relation to interstate commerce” test. Regulation involving 
objects that appear to have no commercial value, such as endangered 
species and national waterways, present a trickier question. 
The same year Morrison was handed down, the Fourth Circuit 
upheld in Gibbs v. Babbitt, a federal regulation for the taking of red 
wolves by farmers under the Commerce Clause.345 The Gibbs court 
found that “[t]he taking of red wolves implicates a variety of commercial 
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activities and is closely connected to several interstate markets.”346 The 
Gibbs court also found that “[t]he relationship between red wolf takings 
and interstate commerce is quite direct,” observing that the red wolf is 
the subject of scientific research, wolf-related tourism, and trade in 
pelts.347 The court further observed that “the individual takings may be 
aggregated for the purpose of Commerce Clause analysis,” meaning that 
“[w]hile the taking of one red wolf on private land may not be 
‘substantial,’ the takings of red wolves in the aggregate have a sufficient 
impact on interstate commerce” to support the regulation.348 This last 
observation may be the most important element in saving the Clean 
Water Act. 
Three years after Gibbs, the Fifth Circuit upheld a federal 
regulation in GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton under the 
Commerce Clause for the taking by commercial real estate developers of 
cave species protected under the Endangered Species Act.349 The GDF 
Realty Court cited the Gibbs opinion favorably to support its decision.350 
Also in 2003, the D.C. Circuit upheld a federal regulation in Rancho 
Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton for the taking of the arroyo southwestern toad 
under the Endangered Species Act.351 The Rancho Viejo court found that 
the activity being regulated, namely construction of a commercial 
housing development, was “plainly an economic enterprise.”352 
Two years later, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court upheld a 
federal regulation of personal cultivation of marijuana by private 
individuals under the Controlled Substances Act.353 The Raich Court 
found that the Controlled Substances Act was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the regulated activity—the 
manufacture, possession, and sale of potentially harmful drugs—
represented a huge interstate economic market. The Court also addressed 
the issue of personal cultivation as it relates to cumulative effects 
aggregation, which this comment will address infra.354 
Legislation such as the Endangered Species Act and the Controlled 
Substances Act are undisputedly rooted in Congress’s commerce power. 
Although it is difficult to see how an endangered fly could be protected 
under the Commerce Clause, the courts have consistently upheld the 
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takings provisions of the ESA, often in combination of the doctrine of 
cumulative effects aggregation to bring local activities within its reach. A 
similar analysis could apply to federal regulation under the Clean Water 
Act, were it not rooted geographically in the waters of the United States. 
2. The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Independent 
Commerce Clause Power 
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act under its commerce 
power to protect the nation and its economy from the unintended 
consequences of irrevocable loss in biodiversity.355 The ESA has no 
geographic jurisdictional limit; a violation of the ESA may take place 
anywhere in the United States.356 The Supreme Court has never 
questioned the constitutionality of the ESA and other federal courts have 
consistently supported the legislation.357 In GDF Realty v. Norton, for 
example, the Fifth Circuit referred to an ESA Senate Report to support 
the proposition that there existed a link between intrastate species 
preservation and interstate commerce.358 
One feature of the ESA requires courts to consider the safety of 
endangered species above all other concerns, including cost to regulated 
parties.359 In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme Court 
observed that “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting [the Endangered 
Species Act] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, 
whatever the cost,”360 and that “the plain language of the Act, buttressed 
by its legislative history, shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of 
endangered species as ‘incalculable.’”361 Thus, the Tennessee Valley 
Court refused to engage in weighing of the equities urged by the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, observing that “even [if it] had the power to 
engage in such a weighing process,” it would be difficult to “balance the 
loss of a sum certain . . . against a congressionally declared ‘incalculable’ 
value.”362 
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In enforcing the Endangered Species Act, the Tennessee Valley 
Court declined to comment on the ESA’s constitutionality.363 The Court 
instead restated the long-standing doctrine that it is not for the judicial 
branch to inquire into the wisdom of Congress’s priorities.364 Instead, “it 
is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to “enforce 
them when enforcement is sought.”365 
Judicial deference to Congress plays an important part in the 
possibility of amending the Clean Water Act. Congress could easily 
repair the CWA by removing the geographic jurisdictional limit, as with 
the Endangered Species Act; arguing that the Supreme Court would not 
uphold the legislation would be difficult. All that would remain to 
complete the scheme is addressing the seemingly insignificant acts that, 
as a whole, had a significant affect on interstate commerce and navigable 
waters. The doctrine of cumulative effects aggregation could bring the 
CWA the rest of the way. 
3. Cumulative Effects Aggregation: Wickard 
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulation 
of an individual farmer’s production and consumption of homegrown 
wheat.366 The Court reasoned that the consumption of homegrown wheat, 
even in small quantities, has an effect on the price and market for wheat 
sold in interstate commerce. The Wickard Court announced a cumulative 
effects aggregation theory as a framework to assess whether an activity 
has a “substantial influence” on interstate commerce.367 The doctrine 
holds that when Congress regulates a commercial activity that has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce, such as selling marijuana, any 
local instance of that activity is a violation of that regulation.368 
In Maryland v. Wirtz, the Supreme Court observed that “the power 
to regulate commerce, though broad indeed, has limits” and that the 
Court has ample power to enforce those limits.369 The Wirtz Court stated 
that “[n]either here nor in Wickard had the Court declared that Congress 
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may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad 
general regulation of state or private activities.”370 Rather, the Wirtz 
Court observed that “[t]he Court has said only that where a general 
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de 
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of 
no consequence.”371 
Most recently, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court upheld regulation of 
personal cultivation of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act.372 
The Raich Court, following Wickard, reasoned that even a localized 
instance of a regulated activity constitutes a violation of that 
regulation.373 In an amendment to the Clean Water Act, it could mean 
that Rapanos would be held liable for his local violation of a federal 
regulation of commercial activity, namely, his commercial development 
of private land. 
In practical application, the doctrine of cumulative effects 
aggregation can be stated to mean that where the general regulatory 
statute (here, the CWA) bears a “substantial relation to commerce,” 
individual instances of violation are actionable regardless of how large or 
small the violation. Thus, were Congress to revise the Clean Water Act 
to remove all reference to “navigable water” and authorize the EPA to 
create a regulatory agency to administer the CWA, the debate over what 
waters qualify as “navigable” would become irrelevant. The activity, i.e. 
intrastate dumping or filling as it relates to the physical or chemical 
quality of interstate water or its aquatic life, would be regulated, not the 
waters themselves. Likewise, the activity of commercial land 
development would also be regulated. 
IV. CONCLUSION: CONGRESS SHOULD JETTISON THE “NAVIGABLE 
WATERS” BALLAST 
Congress typically roots its national environmental and pollution 
legislation in its power to regulate commerce.374 In the case of the Clean 
Water Act, however, Congress unwisely crafted the language of the 
Clean Water Act in the shadow of the framework of navigational 
servitude.375 Congress’s decision to write a geographic jurisdictional 
limitation has undermined the stated purpose of the CWA, created 
confusion in the judiciary as to the CWA’s jurisdiction, and unfairly 
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forced scientific decisions into our nation’s courtrooms.376 Moreover, 
Congress has been unfair to the regulated parties, costing them untold 
sums in litigation and incalculable injury in the uncertainty of their 
expected behavior under the CWA. 
The EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers have been acting in as 
broad a scope as possible since 1975.377 However, without adequate 
support from Congress, these agencies experience problems with 
enforcement, which results in confusion and expense for the agency and 
more uncertainty for the regulated parties.378 Under Rapanos, courts may 
attack Corps’ jurisdictional determinations with relative ease under either 
the plurality or the concurring opinions, or a combination of the two.379 
Therefore, agency rulings to clarify CWA jurisdiction would be 
ineffective. 
Clearly, responsibility for the nation’s water quality cannot be left 
to the states. As discussed supra, “States and Tribes may assume 
operation of the [CWA’s] section 404 program, and to date two have 
done so (Michigan and New Jersey).”380 Congress enacted the Clean 
Water Act because the States had refused to assume such responsibility. 
The current instability created by the Rapanos Court’s insistence on 
case-by-case analysis for CWA jurisdiction will certainly cause the 
Clean Water Act to collapse as private owners and States’ rights 
advocates gain momentum in the courts. Riverside Bayview and 
SWANCC restrict the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act and, if 
Congress does not act now, the Clean Water Act will be significantly 
weakened. 
The Clean Water Act has not been substantially reworked since 
1977.381 The judicial branch supports Congress’s ability to enact 
environmental and pollution control legislation.382 In fact, no federal 
environmental law has been found to exceed Congress’s authority to 
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regulate activities that, even as taken in the aggregate, substantially affect 
interstate commerce.383 If it is truly Congress’s intent that the EPA and 
the Corps assert their jurisdiction expansively, Congress absolutely must 
amend the statutory language to support that position. 
Until and unless that happens, the EPA, the Corps, regulated 
individuals, and the courts will struggle to define an unstable patchwork 
of “substantial nexus” jurisdiction. Interested private parties will bring 
suits in the federal courts to get the business-friendly decisions they 
need. The courts will continue to weaken the Corps’ jurisdiction until the 
Clean Water Act resembles more closely the River and Harbors Act of 
1899 that it replaced. In the end, any scenario except an act of Congress 
will create considerable litigation expense, inconsistency, and ultimate 
failure to serve the stated federal pollution control objectives of the 
Clean Water Act. 
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